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Abstract
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in
Prisoner’s Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade popula-
tions of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering
to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on
their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and
whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according
to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with
untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired
with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for
people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience
more cooperation in comparison with controls?
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1 Introduction
There are two related problems of cooperation in bargaining environments. The first
problem is to explain why and how people bargain their way to Pareto efficient, off-
equilibrium path outcomes. This problem has received considerable attention in the
recent literature (Guth, et al., 1982; BDMc, 1995; Roth, 1995; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000;
McCabe, et al., 2001). The second problem is to say how cooperation can be sustained
once it emerges. The second problem has received comparably less attention than the
first.
Even though sustaining cooperation has received less attention in bargaining situa-
tions, it has been a primary focus in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and public good games
(Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Andreoni and Varian, 1999; Axelrod, 1984, 1997; Bohnet
and Ku¨bler, 2005; Kreps, et al., 1982; Ledyard, 1995). Consider the analysis of the
finitely repeated PD game in Axelrod (1984). In this game, always defecting is an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the sense that it does not pay to cooperate in
a population where everyone else always defects. Yet a small band of conditional co-
operators (say, tit-for-tat players) can invade a population of unconditional defectors
provided that the cooperators can cluster. That is, if these cooperators interact more
often with each other than with the defectors (or if the result of two cooperators meet-
ing is advantageous enough), then the population can be invaded. For clustering to
work, though, it must be the case that the probability of two members of the relevant
subpopulation meeting is greater than the probability of two arbitrary members of the
population at large meeting. The problem in populations without clustering is that the
chance of members from a small band of conditional cooperators meeting each other is
comparatively low.
We want to adapt this idea of population clustering to a simple two-person trust
game. The clustering in our trust game will be a function of recent behavior in this
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bargaining environment. An agent’s history of choices gives him a track record. Players
can be typed based on their recent track record as whether or not they are trusting (for
Players 1), and whether or not they are trustworthy (for Players 2). Once the players
are typed, they can then be paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy
types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. If some people are inclined
to trust, this sort of matching protocol will implement clustering within the population.
The empirical question that we want to address is whether this adaptation of clustering
to bargaining environments can sustain cooperative play analogous to the situation in
finitely repeated PD games. That is, if cooperative play emerges in the trust game, can
the level be maintained via an endogenous matching rule? This paper studies the effect
of an experimental treatment controlling for the history of cooperation by procedures
unknown to the subjects so that cooperation is not sustained by common knowledge
and expectations about the particular clustering mechanism in the population.
Why do we use a procedure in which subjects are not informed that cooperation (de-
fection) will result in their being matched with people who are also likely to cooperate
(defect)? We want to inquire whether the experience of cooperation reinforces innate
tendencies to cooperate causing it to grow relative to the occurrence of defection behav-
ior, and we want to do this without contaminating the measurements with advantages
gained by cooperative behavior deliberately chosen to gain access to other cooperators.
We want potential cooperators to discover they are in an environment conducive to
cooperation and then to do whatever comes naturally; not strategically choose that en-
vironment because it is incentive compatible. The equilibrium of the game is no longer
to defect, if defection reduces one’s access to those likely to cooperate. We do not
reveal the matching algorithm because the research hypothesis is not about behavior
when people know they are matched with someone likely to cooperate. Rather, it is
about what people do who, contrary to their immediate game theoretic self-interest,
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Fig. 1: Trust Game
initiate or reciprocate cooperation, and who find themselves in an environment with
other similarly disposed people. Does cooperation build, or does it deteriorate among
such individuals?
In the next section we describe a two-person extensive-form trust game and our
mechanism for clustering the population. We then discuss the design which consists of
two treatments: the baseline where players are matched randomly and another where
liked types have an increased likelihood of interacting and procedures (Section 3). Data
analysis follows in Section 4 and concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
2 Sustaining Trust
In the trust game pictured in Figure 1, Player 1 is asked to choose from the following:
(1) You are given $40, which you can split evenly with another person—Player 2—in
which case the game is over or (2) You present Player 2 with two choices, either Player
2 can take $30 out of $45, leaving you $15; or she can split $50 evenly between the two
of you. Player 1 faces a $5 opportunity cost to interact with Player 2.
A standard backward induction argument verifies that the unique subgame perfect
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equilibrium (SPE) of this game is the (20, 20) outcome determined by the pure strategy
(R, d): a rational Player 2 would strictly prefer $30 to $25, and so would choose down
(d) at her decision node; knowing this a rational, self-interested Player 1, who prefers
$20 to $15, would therefore choose Right (R) at his decision node.
Although the pure strategy profile (R, d) is the unique SPE, it is not an evolutionary
stable strategy: (R, d) is a Nash equilibrium but it is not strict, and thus cannot be
an ESS (Weibull, 1995, Proposition 5.1). Intuitively, the situation is this. Consider
a population in which Players 1 all play R and Players 2 all play d. Players 2 are
susceptible to a certain amount of drift: a mutant Player 2 who would play r were she
given the chance has the same fitness as a non-mutant Player 2. So selection pressures
cannot rule out that such mutant Players 2 will thrive equally as well as their non-
mutant peers. Consequently, a mutant Player 1 who plays D instead of R may well
meet a mutant Player 2. If the proportion of mutant Players 2 is high enough, then
such a Player 1 will achieve a higher level of fitness than his non-mutant peers, namely
a payoff of 20. And so it cannot be ruled out that the population of (R, d) players will
be destabilized due to the drift of Player 2 and subsequent mutation of Player 1.
This raises the empirical question with which we are concerned. Since (R, d) is
not an ESS we know that it is possible for cooperation to emerge in this environment.
What we want to know is what the behavioral and institutional preconditions are for
such cooperation to actually emerge and be sustained. This is an empirical question.
In particular, is the mere possibility of random drift enough to allow cooperation to
emerge and be sustained, or can the level of cooperation and its stability be encouraged
by population clustering?
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2.1 Clustering in the Trust Game
We implement the idea of clustering by typing players based on their observed moves
in the trust game above, and in one treatment match players based on their types.
Types come in the form of a “trust score”, τ jn, where j= 1 or 2 for player role, n
indicates the round, and τ ∈ [0, 1]. τ is defined algorithmically. See Appendix A for a
detailed description of the algorithms for both players. A move by Player i is a labeled
a defection move just in case it is i’s strategy in the subgame perfect strategy profile.
A move by Player i is labeled a cooperative move just in case it is not a defection
move. The idea is each player will have a score that is updated following each round.
A player’s trust score is essentially a fraction, where the numerator is the number of
times the player has cooperated, and the denominator is the number of chances the
player has had to cooperate.
If Player 1 chooses a cooperative move, then the numerator of their trust score is
incremented by 1; otherwise it remains the same. If the current Round n ≤ 5, then the
denominator of their trust score is n; otherwise it is 5. That the divisor, when n > 5, is
always 5 puts a premium on the last five interactions of the players. Pre-theoretically,
there is a recency effect of goodwill—recent acts of goodwill overshadow distant acts of
ill-will and vice versa. The trust score algorithm for Player 1 codifies this intuition by
only keeping track of the behavior over the most recent five rounds.
To compute the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n, we need to first compute
the number of times that Player 2 has had an opportunity to make a choice—the idea
being that her trust score should neither be incremented nor decremented in cases
where Player 1 chooses his outside option.1 This will be recorded as Player 2’s oppor-
1Why would one adopt a prior that observing Player 1 defect would not affect Player 2’s cooperative
propensities? One might indeed think that a Player 2’s trust score should be decremented in cases
where Player 1 chooses his outside option; the idea being that Player 2’s cooperative propensity, in
such cases, gets infected by the observation of non-cooperative play by Player 1. Whether or not some
portion of the population reacts in this way is an empirical question. But even assuming this view is
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tunity score. We need to make a similar allowance to codify the recency effect of trust
and trustworthiness. Instead of tracking the behavior of Player 2 (for the purposes
of computing her trust score) over the most recent five rounds, we need instead track
it over the most recent five rounds in which she had an opportunity to make a deci-
sion. We simply need to verify if Player 1 moved down (right), in which case Player
2’s opportunity score is (not) incremented. We will call this queue her omega queue.
Player 2’s trust score is calculated almost exactly as Player 1’s, but the denominator is
opportunity score, rather than round.
We assume that both Player 1 and Player 2 begin with a trust score of zero. At
the end of each round, the algorithm begins by looping through the decisions made
by all the Players 1 and calculating their respective score and then does the same for
all the Players 2. At the completion of each round, each player has a trust score that
essentially tracks the relative frequency of cooperative moves up to that round.
2.2 Experimental Treatments
The two treatments reported below differ according to their matching protocol. In the
baseline condition—the Random treatment— subjects are randomly paired each period.
Trust scores in the Random treatment are tracked, but not used in matching Players
1 and Players 2. The experimental treatment—the Sorted treatment—pairs subjects
according to their trust scores. The matching protocol for the Sorted treatment is
straightforward: At the end of Round n Players 1 are rank-ordered by their trust scores
(high to low). Similarly for Players 2. Then the matching rule simply pairs the highest
correct, the result of using our trust score algorithms (which are not sensitive to this posited behavior)
in the matching experiments would be that some Players 2 have an artificially high trust score. Thus,
when matched according to trust scores, some such Players 2 may be matched with (real) trusting
Players 1. But notice that this would make the observation of sustained cooperative play rather more
difficult to achieve. Hence, if the experimental results indicate such sustained cooperative behavior
even using our scoring algorithms, then those results should be thought of as rather robust.
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ranked Player 1 with the highest ranked Player 2 for interaction in Round n + 1, the
next to highest ranked Player 1 with the next to highest ranked Player 2 for interaction
in Round n+ 1, and so on.2
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experiments were conducted with undergraduate students from a variety of majors
at The University of Arizona. A total of eight experimental sessions were run: four
sessions of the Sorted treatment and four sessions of the Random treatment.3 Each
experimental session consisted of 16 subjects.4
A subject is paid $5 for showing up on time and immediately (and randomly) seated
at a computer terminal in a large room containing 40 terminals. Each terminal is in a
separate cubicle, and the subjects are dispersed so that no subject can see the terminal
screen of another. Each person is randomly assigned a role (Player 1 or 2) and keeps
this role for the entirety of the experiment. The instructions for each experiment do not
use words like ‘game’, ‘play’, ‘player’, ‘opponent’, ‘partner, ‘trust’, etc.; rather neutral
terms such as ‘decision problem’, ‘decision maker 1 (DM1)’, ‘DM2’, ‘your counterpart’,
etc. are used in order to provide a baseline context.
The interactions in the experiment consist of anonymous pairings in a computerized
game. By using a mouse, each Player 1 can click on the right or down arrows. A player
confirms his choice by clicking on a “Send” button. This move information is then
displayed on their counterpart’s screen. If Player 1 moves down, Player 2 would be
prompted to click on the right or down arrow (again confirming her choice by clicking
on a “Send” button). This move information is then displayed on Player 1’s screen.
2Ties in trust scores are broken randomly.
3The first session was run on 09/05/00. In order to control for some variability we ran all of the
sessions at the same time of day, taking two weeks to complete.
4Two randomized treatments only had 14 subjects due to no shows.
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Sessions Subjects Observations
Sorted 4 64 1280
Random 4 60 1200
Table 1: Experimental Design
Earnings are shown to both Player 1 and Player 2 after each period. The game is
sequential in structure—i.e. we do not employ the strategy method to elicit choices.
Subjects respond to actual move information when making a decision.
The payoffs represent the experimental dollar amounts the subjects could earn with
an exchange rate of 20 experimental dollars equal to 1 U.S. dollar; both the payoffs and
the exchange rate are common information. The games were played sequentially for 20
periods, although the subjects do not know the total number of periods until the session
is complete.5 At the end of the experiment, their accumulated earnings were paid to
them privately (single-blind protocol). The experiments lasted on average a little under
one hour, from arrival to completion. Subjects’ earnings (not including the show-up
fee) average $21.00 (s = 1.8) in the Random treatment and $23.00 (s = 2.1) in the
Sorted treatment. The subjects did not have prior experience with this environment
or others like it. Each subject participated in one and only one such experiment. See
Table 1 for a summary of the experimental design.
The instructions stated the following about matching (see Appendix B for detailed
instructions): “Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart
for that period. You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.”
We did not reveal the exact assignment rule to any of the subjects because we were
5The subjects did know that they were recruited for a one-hour experiment and each of the sessions
lasted almost the entire time. It is true that by not reveling the end point to the subjects, we may have
introduced a bias in favor of seeing more cooperation relative to a condition where subjects know the
end point. However, that being said, the information the subjects have is the same across treatments,
and we are interested in comparison of treatments so we do not worry too much about this potential
bias in our results.
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concerned that such information might generate a difference in strategic behavior. This
is especially the case in the Sorted environment—knowing that cooperators are being
matched each period might lead individuals to alter their type for strategic reasons
rather than due to reciprocity type motives.
Anonymously matched subjects in a single play trust game have a strong incen-
tive to choose dominant strategies and to expect the same of their counterpart. They
have no knowledge of the types with which they are paired, yet many subjects exhibit
trusting/trustworthy behavior. Since they make more money than if they play non-
cooperatively, they can hardly be said not to be rational. If such behavior is deeply
ingrained in a subset of every sample of subjects, then the greater experience of reci-
procity in repeat interaction, the greater should be the use of such strategies by these
subjects. The sorting protocol enables clustering to occur while controlling for the
information that would allow clustering to be the deliberate, constructively rational
choice of those who otherwise would choose non-cooperatively.
4 Results
Table 2 provides the conditional outcome frequencies by blocks of five trials for the
Sorted and Random conditions. Note that in the first trial block (rounds 1–5) roughly
half of the play occurs at the SPE in both treatments and about half of the cooperative
ventures by Player 1 are reciprocated. There is not a statistically significant differ-
ence between either the amount of play which reaches the SPE (p = 0.4691) or the
amount of play which reaches the efficient outcome (p = 0.5775).6 By the second trial
block, however, there are significant differences in the mean proportion of outcomes
across treatments. This is most pronounced in the last trial block. When subjects
6p-values being reported are from two sample t-tests examining whether or not the means in question
are different, unless otherwise noted.
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Player 1 Player 2
Trials No Trust (%) Trust (%) Trustworthy (%) Not Trustworthy (%)
Sorted
1–5 46.25 53.75 51.16 48.84
6–10 50.00 50.00 72.50 27.50
11–15 48.13 51.88 84.34 15.66
16–20 46.88 53.13 83.53 16.47
Random
1–5 48.67 51.33 46.75 53.25
6–10 62.67 37.33 42.86 57.14
11–15 62.00 38.00 38.60 61.40
16–20 72.67 27.33 51.22 48.78
Table 2: Conditional Outcomes by Trial Block
are sorted based on their trust scores there are far fewer pairs ending up at the SPE;
when subjects are sorted, more pairs reach the cooperative outcome than when they
are randomly matched each round. Players 1 reach the SPE 46.88% of the time in
the Sorted treatment as compared to 72.67% in the Random treatment (p = 0.0088).
Furthermore, Players 2 who are paired with trusting Players 1 respond in kind in the
Sorted treatment 83.53% of the time compared with 51.22% of the time in the Random
treatment (p = 0.0128).7 One question is how well trusting Players 1 do compared to
playing the SPE outcome in both treatments. In the Sorted treatment, the expected
value of trust based on the average frequencies of cooperation and defection moves by
Players 2 is $22.29.8 In the Random treatment, the expected value of trust based on
the average frequencies of cooperation and defection moves by Players 2 is $19.49.9 So
in the Sorted treatment, it pays for the Players 1 to be trusting; this is not the case in
7It was interesting watching the results come in from these experiments. What was easy to observe
is that by Round 10 in the Sorted treatment around half of the Players 1 were playing SPE (i.e.
playing Right), so their trust scores began deteriorating rapidly and about half were trusting (i.e.,
playing Down), keeping their trust scores near the maximum. Most of the trusting interactions were
met with trustworthiness by their counterpart, keeping more than half of the Players 2 trust scores
high as well. This was not the case in the Random treatment.
8EV(trust|sorted) = 0.7288($25) + 0.2712($15) = $22.288 > $20 = EV(spe).
9EV(trust|random) = 0.4485($25) + 0.5515($15) = $19.485 < $20 = EV(spe) .
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Fig. 2: Percent of Players 1 Trusting Over Time
the Random treatment.
The above is aggregated in trial blocks. The dynamics of play over time reveals
the same trends, albeit more graphically. Figures 2 and 3 show the mean fraction of
each type of play over the 20 rounds for both treatment conditions. The trends are
unmistakable: as play proceeds through the later rounds, cooperation emerges and
is sustained among the sorted subjects, but there is no similar round-effect for the
randomly paired subjects.
4.1 Trust Scores
Along these same lines, it is interesting to look at the trust scores.10 Remember that
in both the Random and Sorted treatment a trust score is calculated for each player
based on their decisions, but only the Sorted treatment matches players according to
10One potential concern about our particular algorithm is given the sequential nature of the game
Players’ 2 trust scores are slow to increment. However, Player 2’s first chance (second chance) to move
occurs early in the Sorted treatment—round 2.34 (round 4.56). This is not significantly different from
the Random treatment. Since Players’ 2 first and second opportunity to move occurs early in the
game, their trust scores are in fact not slow to be incremented.
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their score.
Since the trust scores track the behavioral data, it is not surprising that an exami-
nation of the scores tells a very similar story to that of the outcome frequencies. The
average trust score over the first 10 rounds—slightly smaller than a half—is statistically
the same for the two treatments (p = .4850 for 1–5 and p = .2690 for 6–10, using a
Kolmogrov–Smirnov test for equality of distributions). However, in the last 10 rounds
the trust scores are significantly higher under the Sorted condition than in the Random,
with an average of 0.5 in the former and 0.36 in the latter (p = .0000 for 11–15 and
p = .0000 for 16–20, using a K–S test).
Figures 4 and 5 allow comparison of the number of people (i.e., Count) with a par-
ticular trust score over time across the two conditions. Notice that Count for those
with the lowest trust score (τ j1 ≤ 0.1) is the same across treatments, and Count for
those with the highest trust score (τ j1 = 1) following round 1 is the same across treat-
ments indicating the two treatments have the same initial conditions for the number
of people with low and high trust scores. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
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the trends for the number of people with the lowest trust score is also the same across
the two treatments, yet the trends for τ jn = 1 differ dramatically. In Random, there
is a significant drop in the number of people with the maximum trust score, demon-
strated by the flattening of the height of the bar of τ jn = 1 as Round increases from 1
to 20, whereas in Sorted there is significant growth in the number of players with the
maximum trust score, seen in the growth of the peak τ jn = 1 (especially after Round
10). Our sorting mechanism has little effect on those at the extremely low end of the
trust/trustworthy spectrum, but it does have a dramatic impact on the high end of
the cooperative spectrum. In Random, there is significant noise in the population as is
indicated by the amount of players in the middle of the trust score range. However, in
Sorted these “middle players” get pushed into the high range with the result that the
population becomes much more segregated under sorting.
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4.2 Trust and Trustworthiness
Here we report logit regression results which examine Players 1 trust and Players 2
trustworthiness over time (see Table 3). The data columns for Trust shows the logit
coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the regression of ln p(t)
1−p(t) , t = 1, 2, . . . , 20, where
p(t) is the probability a Player 1 is trusting (i.e., moves Down) in Round t, and 1−p(t)
is the probability that Player 1 will not be trusting. The independent variables are
Trust Trustworthy
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Constant -.43 −2.26∗ Constant -2.35 −9.13∗∗∗
Round -.06 −4.13∗∗∗ Round -.05 −2.68∗∗
Treat 0.10 0.69 Treat 0.10 0.33
Rnd × Treat 0.07 3.22∗∗∗ Rnd × Treat 0.12 4.62∗∗∗
iType 1.09 8.97∗∗∗ iType 2.09 12.86∗∗∗
N = 1240 N = 1240
pseudo R2 = 0.0726 pseudo R2 = 0.2006
∗ p-values: ∗ ≤ 0.05, ∗∗ ≤ .01, ∗∗∗ ≤ .001.
Table 3: Trust and Trustworthiness Logits
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Round, which takes on the values of 1, 2, . . . , 20; Treat, which is a dummy variable
with a value of 1 for the Sorted treatment, 0 for the Random treatment; Rnd ×
Treat is the interaction effect between Round and Treat; and itype, which is a
dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 1 is an initial cooperator (i.e., moved Down
in Round 1), 0 otherwise.11 The Round coefficient is negative, but small in magnitude.
While Treat is insignificant, the interaction effect Rnd × Treat is highly significant,
indicating that the essence of the treatment effect on trust involves the interaction
between round and treatment. Trust needs time to develop, and is much more likely to
develop over time in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.
The data columns for Trustworthy shows the logit coefficient estimates and t-statistics
for the regression of ln p(t)
1−p(t) , t = 1, 2, . . . , 20, where p(t) is the probability a Player 2 is
trustworthy (i.e., moves right) in Round t, and 1− p(t) is the probability that Player 2
is not trustworthy. The independent variables are Round, which takes on the values of
1, 2, . . . , 20; Treat, which is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the Sorted treat-
ment, 0 for the Random treatment; Rnd × Treat is the interaction effect between
Round and Treat; and itype, which is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 2
is an initial cooperator (i.e., moved right on her first opportunity), 0 otherwise.12 The
Round coefficient is negative, but small in magnitude. As in the regression on Trust,
Treat is insignificant, but the interaction term, Rnd × Treat, is highly significant
in explaining trustworthiness.13 This result indicates that the essence of the treatment
effect on trustworthiness involves the interaction between round and treatment. Trust-
worthiness needs time to develop, and is more likely to develop over time in the Sorted
treatment than in the Random treatment. The regression results in Table 3 report how
11itype, which captures the first move of Player 1, is included rather than a variable that tracks the
previous move of Player 1’s partner (PartnerCoopt−1) to avoid correlation with the treatment variable.
12itype, which captures the first move of Player 2, is included rather than a variable that tracks the
previous move of Player 2’s partner (PartnerTrustt−1) to avoid correlation with the treatment variable.
13Dropping the insignificant variable Treat only effects the constant term in the regression on Trust
and the regression on Trustworthiness.
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the initial typing as well as the interaction effect fuel the development of cooperation
under sorting over time. Overall, then, the econometric results indicate that there is
a significant divergence in the level of cooperative behavior being achieved over time
across the two treatments.
4.3 Efficiency Measure
In every interaction in this environment every joint decision affects more than merely
one’s own monetary costs and benefits. Each player’s trust score is also affected.14 Also
at stake are the gains from exchange, and in particular we can think of whether or not
the players actually achieve the efficient allocation—that is, whether they reach the
off-equilibrium cooperative outcome or not. There is a strong intuition that a good
mechanism is one which rewards those who have a history of trusting/trustworthy be-
havior: such agents should get what they deserve. In the present context this means
that if a person has a history of trusting/trustworthy behavior prior to a certain inter-
action, then there ought to be a premium on her reaching the cooperative outcome in
that interaction. This is a “social variable” in the sense that it is sensitive to more than
just one’s own payoffs and actions, since one’s counterpart has a role in determining
whether or not the cooperative outcome is reached. A society has an interest in seeing
agents with high values of such a variable.
We can capture what is significant about this dimension of social value by intro-
ducing a score for each player j at round n, νjn ∈ [0, 1]. We will call νjn Player j’s
efficiency score at round n. From the point of view of an agent j getting what she
deserves, the best outcome is if j is maximally trusting/trustworthy up to round n and
also reaches the cooperative outcome in n. Conversely, it is far less desirable, socially
14The subjects, of course, do not know that the value of such a score is at stake. But this does not
change the fact that every joint decision reached by a pair of subjects affects each subject’s trust score.
17
speaking, if a maximally untrusting/untrustworthy agent up to round n finds himself
at the cooperative outcome or a maximally trusting/trustworthy agent finds herself
defected upon. Clearly ranking below both of these is the desirability of maximally
untrusting/untrustworthy agents acting in ways consonant with their histories. With
this in mind, then, we define νjn as follows:
νjn =
τ jn + d
2
where d = 0 if Player j did not reach the cooperative outcome in Round n and d = 1
if she did. This variable tracks how efficient play is with respect to the potential social
gains, in the sense described above, to be had from exchange.
The efficiency scores begin in Round 1 at less than 0.40 for both treatments and
remain similar in magnitude through, roughly, the first nine rounds. However, in the
later rounds, the efficiency being achieved in each condition is significantly different: in
the last trial block the average efficiency score in the Sorted treatment is 0.48; whereas
in the Random treatment it is 0.25 (p = .0333). The level of efficiency with respect to
achieving both high trust scores and reaching the cooperative outcome is significantly
greater when subjects are being matched according to their trust score.
4.4 Types and Outcome
Is cooperation being “crowded out” in the Random treatment? That is, supposing
that the initial propensity to cooperate among subjects is the same across treatments,
then the fact that behavior tends toward high levels of repeated cooperative play in the
Sorted treatment, and the fact that behavior tends toward subgame perfect play in the
Random treatment would indeed be evidence that cooperative behavior is reinforced in
the Sorted treatment and crowded out (or undermined) in the Random treatment. To
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Random Sorted
Coop 16/14∗ 17/17
NonCoop 14/16 15/15
∗a/b where a = number of P1s, b = number of P2s.
Table 4: Distribution of Initial Player Types
examine this question, we can classify subjects as either a non-cooperator or cooperator
based on their first observed move.15 Players 1 are a non-cooperating type if in Round 1
they chose (20, 20) and a cooperating type if they chose to play down, passing the game
to their counterpart. Similarly, for Players 2. A Player 2 is a non-cooperating type if
when her counterpart first played down, she chose the defection outcome (15, 30), and
a Player 2 is a cooperating type if she chose the cooperative outcome (25, 25) on her
first available move. See Table 4 for the distribution of initial player types, in which
rows indicate initial player types and columns indicate the matching protocol. Note
that the initial distribution of player types is the same across treatments.
Once we establish this typing, we can analyze how play differs among these groups
depending on whether they are being sorted by their trust scores or simply being ran-
domly re-paired. We want to focus on the last 10 rounds in particular (see Figure 6).
Initial cooperators fare much better when they are meeting other cooperators under
the sorting mechanism than when they randomly meet their counterparts—the last 10
interactions result in an outcome of (25, 25) 62% of the time in the Sorted treatment
compared to only 18% of the time in the Random treatment (p = .0000). This is not
the case for initial non-cooperative types. In fact, there is no treatment effect for the
defecting types: the percentage of cooperative outcomes reached in the last 10 rounds
is not statistically different between the Random and Sorted treatments (p = .1187).
15Basing type on only the first observed move attempts classification of agents according to their
innate tendencies toward cooperation. The first observed move by a Player 2 occurs early: in the
Sorted treatment the median is 1.5 rounds and in the Random treatment it is round 1.
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This suggests that cooperation is crowded out in the Random treatment and fostered
in the Sorted treatment.
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Fig. 6: Cooperators—Trustors/Trustworthy on Initial Decision versus Non-
cooperators—No Trust/Non-Trustworthy on Initial Decision: Percent of Each Type
Reaching the Cooperative Outcome of (25, 25) in the Last 10 Rounds
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4.5 Summary
Here are the three central results from this sorting experiment:
Result 1. In the last 10 rounds, the fraction of subjects reaching the SPE (cooperative
outcome) is dramatically lower (higher) in the Sorted treatment than in the Random
treatment.
Result 2. The average efficiency score, i.e. how efficient play is with respect to the
potential social benefit, is higher in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.
Result 3. In the last 10 rounds, the number of cooperative player types reaching coop-
erative outcomes is far greater in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.
There is no treatment effect for non-cooperative types.
5 Conclusions
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in PD games
allows for some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strate-
gies. Similarly, in the experimental community there are results which suggest that
a similar “clustering” phenomenon can be induced among subjects in public goods
games to sustain high levels of contributions (Gunnthorsdottir, et al., in press). The
results of the sorting experiments here suggest a similar story about behavior in simple
two-person bargaining games. Since the SPE in our trust game is not a strict Nash
Equilibrium, (R, d) is not an ESS. Thus, we know that it is, in principle, possible for
cooperative play to emerge randomly due to evolutionary drift of Players 2. But we
find no behavioral evidence of significant cooperative play which can be attributed to
random drift and mutation in the population. This is because in the Random treatment
the level of efficient outcomes is low and initial cooperators seem to be crowded out
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of the environment. On the other hand, we do find strong evidence that a behavioral
clustering mechanism in this sequential bargaining game increases cooperative play sig-
nificantly over levels reached by players randomly meeting. Sorting subjects by trust
scores accomplishes two tasks. First, it allows cooperative play, which is Pareto-superior
to the SPE to emerge. Second, once cooperative play emerges, sorting subjects does
not allow this behavior to be “infected” and compromised by either defecting Players
2 or by untrusting Players 1. Moreover, the emergence of cooperation is a response to
the experience of an environment of cooperative types, rather than a strategic choice
to enter such an environment.
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A Trust Score Algorithms
Algorithm 1 (Player 1 Trust Score). Let c1 (d1) indicate a cooperative (defection)
move by Player 1. Then the trust score of a Player 1 after Round n, τ 1n, is given by the
following algorithm:
1. If n = 0: τ 10 = 0
2. If n ≤ 5: Let k be the number of c1 moves through Round n− 1. Then:
τ 1n =

k
n
if d1 in Round n
k+1
n
if c1 in Round n
3. If n > 5: Let k be the number of c1 moves in Rounds n− 1, . . . , n− 4. Then:
τ 1n =

k
5
if d1 in Round n
k+1
5
if c1 in Round n
Algorithm 2 (Player 2 Opportunity Score, Omega Queue). Let c1 (d1) indicate a co-
operative (defection) move by Player 1, and let c2 (d2) indicate a cooperative (defection)
move by Player 2. Then Player 2’s opportunity score in Round n, ρn, is given by the
following algorithm:
1. If n = 0: ρ0 = 0
2. If n ≥ 1:
ρn =
 ρn−1 if d1 in Round nρn−1 + 1 if c1 in Round n
Where n ≥ 5, let Ωn−1 be the four most recent rounds prior to Round n in which Player
2 has had a chance to move.
Algorithm 3 (Player 2 Trust Score). Let c2 (d2) indicate a cooperative (defection)
move by Player 2. Then the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n, τ 2n, is given by the
following algorithm:
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1. If n = 0: τ 20 = 0
2. If ρn = ρn−1: τ 2n = τ
2
n−1
3. If ρn 6= ρn−1, ρn ≤ 5, and n ≤ 5: Let k be the number of c2 moves through Round
n− 1. Then:
τ 2n =

k
ρn
if d2 in Round n
k+1
ρn
if c2 in Round n
4. If ρn 6= ρn−1, ρn ≤ 5, and n > 5: Let k be the number of c2 moves in Ωn−1. Then:
τ 2n =

k
ρn
if d2 in Round n
k+1
ρn
if c2 in Round n
5. If ρn 6= ρn−1 and ρn ≥ 5: Let k be the number of c2 moves in Ωn−1. Then:
τ 2n =

k
5
if d2 in Round n
k+1
5
if c2 in Round n
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B Computerized Instructions for Both Treatments
Page 1
In this experiment you will participate in a series of two person decision problems. The
experiment will last for several periods. Each period you will be paired with another
individual: your counterpart for that period. The joint decisions made by you and
your counterpart for that period will determine how much money you will earn in that
period. After each period you will be re-paired.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not tell
anyone else your earnings. We ask that you do not discuss your earnings with anyone
else. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question at any
time, please raise your hand and someone will come by to help.
Page 2
Notice that another button, “Back”, has appeared at the bottom of the page. If at
any time you wish to return to a previous page, click “Back”. To continue reading the
directions, click “Next”.
Page 3
You will see a diagram similar to this one at the beginning of the experiment. You and
another person will participate in a decision problem like the diagram below. We will
refer to this other person as your counterpart.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
One of you will be DM 1. The other person will be DM 2. Beside the diagram we show
whether you are DM 1 or DM 2. In this example, for now, you are DM 1. Please click
“Next” to continue.
Page 4
Notice the boxes with letters in them. These letters will be replaced by numbers
representing Experimental Dollars during the experiment. For 20 Experimental Dollars
you will earn 1 U.S. dollar. The boxes with numbers show the different earnings in
Experimental Dollars that you and your counterpart can make. There are two numbers
in each box. The number on the top (which is indented now) is DM 1’s earnings if this
box is reached. The number on the bottom is DM 2’s earnings.
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SCREEN DIAGRAM
You and your counterpart will jointly determine a path through the diagram to an
earnings box. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 5
A path is defined as sequence of moves through the diagram.
A move is a choice of direction in the diagram.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
The arrows in the diagram show the possible directions of moves that can be made.
Notice that the moves for both DM 1 and DM 2 are always DOWN or RIGHT. When
you click on either arrow, the path is highlighted.
The circles in the diagram with numbers in them indicate who gets to move at that
point in the diagram. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 6
For example, DM 1 starts the process at the top of the diagram by moving right or
down. If DM 1 moves right the experiment is over. DM 1 earns ‘zig’ and DM 2 earns
‘zog’.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
If DM 1 moves down, it is DM 2’s turn to move. DM 2 can move right or down. If DM
2 moves right, DM 1 earns ‘wig’ and DM 2 earns ‘wog’. If DM 2 moves down, DM 1
earns ‘xig’ and DM 2 earns ‘xog’.
The decision path that was chosen will be highlighted. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 7
We will now show you what the decisions look like from the point of view of DM 1.
When you are DM 1 you move first. The arrows show you can move right or down.
In order to move, click on the arrow for your choice. DM 2 will only see your decision
when you click the “Send” button to finalize your decision. To see how this works, click
the RIGHT ARROW now. Be sure to click “Send” to finalize your move.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
At this point the moves are over. The path taken is highlighted white and earnings
received are highlighted. Please click ‘Next’ to continue.
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Page 8
As another example as DM 1, move DOWN by clicking on the arrow. To confirm your
move click the ”Send” button.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
Once the subject makes the choice, the following appears: Since you moved Down as
DM 1, DM 2, seeing your move, now has a decision to make. If DM 2 moves right then
you would earn ‘wig’ and DM 2 would earn ’wog’. If DM 2 moves down then you would
earn ‘xig’ and DM 2 would earn ‘xog’. Please click Next to continue.
Page 9
We will now show you what decisions look like from DM 2’s point of view. Notice that
your earnings are indented and this is the BOTTOM NUMBER in the boxes. You will
only have a move if DM 1 moves down. Suppose DM 1 has moved down. You have to
decide to move right or down. Please make a choice now by clicking on the arrow of
your choice. Then click “Send” to confirm your move.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
Either the subject moves Right as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you
moved Right as DM 2, DM 1’s earnings are ‘wig’. Your earnings are ‘wog’. Please click
“Next” to continue.
OR the subject moves Down as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you
moved Down as DM 2, DM 1’s earnings are ‘xig’. Your earnings are ‘xog’. Please click
“Next” to continue.
Page 10
IMPORTANT POINTS:
∗ Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that
period.
∗ You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.
∗ If you are DM 1, your counterpart will be DM 2. In this case, you will make a
decision first. On the other hand, if you are DM 2, your counterpart will be DM
1. If this is the case, you will have a decision to make if DM 1 chooses down.
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∗ If you are DM 1, your payoff in Experimental Dollars is the top number in the
box. If you are DM 2, your payoff in Experimental Dollars is the bottom number
in the box. You will receive that amount of money if the box is reached. For
every 20 Experimental Dollars you earn, you will receive 1 U.S. Dollar.
This concludes the directions. If you wish to return to them please click the “Back”
button. If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, to begin the
experiment, please click the green button, “Finished with directions”.
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